REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				*Form Approved* *OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)* 04-05-2009	**2. REPORT TYPE** FINAL	**3. DATES COVERED** *(From - To)* 9 Feb – 4 May 2009
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE **Theory as Foundation for Strategic Communication Doctrine**		**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER**
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) **Norberto R. Menendez, MAJ, USA** Paper Advisor: Stephanie Helm, Capt, USN		**5d. PROJECT NUMBER**
		5e. TASK NUMBER
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207		**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)**
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. ABSTRACT

Civilian and military leaders throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledge the importance of strategic communication for operational forces today. Although strategic communication has been defined in the DoD, much still needs to be done to develop joint doctrine that geographical combatant commands (GCCs) can use for implementing strategic communication in support of operations. This paper examines the development of strategic communication in the 21st century, discusses a framework for analysis and a model for communication which could be used as the foundation for doctrine, and provides recommendations for the future development of strategic communication joint doctrine.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Strategic Communication, Theory, Public Diplomacy, Information Operations, framework for analysis, geographic combatant commands, pragmatic complexity model

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**	**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**	**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON** Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	**b. ABSTRACT** UNCLASSIFIED	**c. THIS PAGE** UNCLASSIFIED		29	**19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)* 401-841-3556

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

Theory as Foundation for Strategic Communication Doctrine

by

Norberto R. Menendez

Major, United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

04 MAY 2009

Contents

Abstract

Civilian and military leaders throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledge the importance of strategic communication for operational forces today. Although strategic communication has been defined in the DoD, much still needs to be done to develop joint doctrine that geographical combatant commands (GCCs) can use for implementing strategic communication in support of operations. This paper examines the development of strategic communication in the 21st century, discusses a framework for analysis and a model for communication which could be used as the foundation for doctrine, and provides recommendations for the future development of strategic communication joint doctrine.

INTRODUCTION

> *To succeed, we must understand the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas…*
> *-- Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, 2004*

The United States has engaged in a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq for nearly a decade. Consequently, the United States Government (USG) has recognized the importance of strategic communication in the counterinsurgency environment and beyond. The 2006 *National Security Strategy of the United States* highlights that "in the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the war of ideas,"[1] and the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* states "victory in the long war ultimately depends on the strategic communication by the United States…"[2]

Strategic communication has been the topic of several studies in the Department of Defense (DoD). Scholars are studying its complexities, and geographic combatant command (GCC) commanders continuously emphasize its importance. In 2007, U.S. Southern Command's Admiral James Stavridis paraphrased World War II Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King: "I don't know what the hell this [strategic communication] is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it."[3] Remarkably, despite the level of attention given to strategic communication, there is no joint doctrine. This lack of doctrine has made it very difficult for GCCs to integrate and execute strategic communication within their areas of responsibility.

Acknowledging that strategic communication joint doctrine is evolving, this paper argues that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) must work to develop and deliver a sound doctrinal model. Doctrine must be anchored on public diplomacy theory, and must integrate

a communications model useful to GCC staffs while executing the joint operational planning process.

BACKGROUND

The concept of strategic communication as it is known today can trace its roots to a document known as the *Report of the Defense Science Board on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Times of Military Conflict* published on May, 2000 (DSB 2000).   This report was the result of a Congressional directive for the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The directive tasked the SECDEF to establish a task force to examine the use of radio and television broadcasting as a propaganda instrument in times of military conflict, and to review the adequacy of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces, to make use of radio and television during operations in the Balkans.[4]

DSB 2000 was initially commissioned as a result of the EC-130E (Commando Solo) aircraft's inability to adequately disseminate television and radio broadcasts in support of operations in the Balkans.[5] However, the task force quickly determined that the report must be "addressed in the context of an overall information operations campaign" and expanded the original intent to include an evaluation of organizational issues associated with PSYOP within the Department of Defense (DoD), and their relationship with intelligence organizations. [6]   Additionally, the task force addressed modern trends in information dissemination and media content creation.

Upon conclusion of the study, the DSB 2000 offered nine recommendations to the SECDEF. These recommendations can be categorized in three groups: recommendations on issues associated with PSYOP as an organization, recommendations on issues associated

with PSYOP ability to tap into media dissemination systems, and recommendations on technical aspects of information dissemination and media content creation.[7] DSB 2000 is important to the defining of strategic communication because the recommendations outlined become the starting point of the next report, the *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination* published on October, 2001 (DSB 2001). Additionally, the term "strategic" is defined in the context of information operations, meaning that the term is simply used to differentiate between the three categories of PSYOP (strategic, operational, and tactical).[8] Strategic PSYOP is primarily conducted outside the military arena, can use DoD support, and is conducted to achieve USG objectives. Operational PSYOP is conducted to support joint forces in a defined operational area, and tactical PSYOP is conducted to support tactical objectives in a defined tactical area. By defining "strategic" this way, "strategic" becomes an effect measured by the size of the audience reached, and the level of objectives supported, a very simplistic characterization that does not account for the complexities of the information domain.

Acting on the recommendations of DSB 2000, DSB 2001 was co-sponsored by the DoD, and the Department of State (DoS). In the terms of reference to the Defense Science Board, the sponsors requested that the Task Force "determine the need and feasibility of a coordinated information dissemination capability within the USG encompassing tactical, operational, and strategic information."[9]

The DSB 2001 addressed two components of strategic information: first, the coordination of national level information, and second, the means to disseminate the message.[10] Accordingly, all ten recommendations reflected concepts to improve on these two components. Recommendations this time can be categorized in two groups,

3

recommendations on systems to improve coordination, and recommendations on purchasing and/or using hardware/software capabilities to disseminate the message.[11]

The DSB 2001 highlights information as a strategic resource less understood but no less important than the other instruments of national power.[12] "Strategic" in this document is used in the context of a level of command. Additionally, every time strategic communication (with and without an "s")[1] is mentioned in the document, it is referring to a capability able to reach multiple and diverse audiences, such as the internet or high-power radios; strategic in the DSB 2001 is a capability as opposed to an effect. For example, the use of the internet to disseminate information to a target audience that has access to the technology, and the act of communicating through this medium. Focus is on the technical aspects of the transmission, instead of the message or the target audience's reaction to the message.

At this point in the development of strategic communication, GCCs and combatant command staffs had very little to work with. Many scholars and leaders recognize the importance of strategic communication, but despite the level of attention given to the matter, JFCOM has not yet begun to develop doctrine. Staffs looking for a frame of reference would have found two reports that do not clearly define strategic communication, each used "strategic" in different contexts, and do not offer a framework from which to begin developing doctrine.

By 2004, the United States was engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This situation prompted the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) to request the Defense Science Board to conduct a study on the transition to and from hostilities.[13] As a result of this request, one of the six panels assembled for the study revisited the topic of the

---

[1] Strategic Communication is the proper term for the topic of this paper. Strategic Communications (with an "s") refer to equipment used for communicating at the strategic level of command.

DSB 2001 and commenced work on the *Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication* published on September, 2004 (DSB 2004).

Using the DSB 2001 as the baseline, the DSB 2004 examined the recommendations given, and expanded their study to account for the new strategic environment as a result of the 9/11 attacks. This was done to determine what new Presidential directive or means might be needed for strategic communication, and how to use open information operations in support of public diplomacy.[14] The DSB 2004 offered seven recommendations which included new legislation to fund the creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication to chair the Strategic Communication Committee (SCC); the creation of two new organizations, the SCC within the National Security Council to coordinate public diplomacy across the interagency, and the independent non-profit Center for Strategic Communication to enhance government-private sector collaboration in support of strategic communication; and several organizational changes to structure aimed at streamlining interagency coordination and support relationships for more effective public diplomacy.[15] The DSB 2004 also recommended that the "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components."[16] However, the DSB 2004 did not address how GCCs might integrate strategic communication into operations, nor did it mention a need for joint strategic communication doctrine to achieve this end.

In the DSB 2004 the term "strategic communication" is used for the first time in the context of its current definition. Unfortunately, the DSB 2004 does not define strategic communication, but the term is used this time to describe a process to "understand,"

"engage," "advice," and "influence" global audiences.[17] Throughout the document, strategic communication is used analogously with public diplomacy.[18]

The next document to address strategic communication is the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report – 2006* (QDR). The QDR addressed strategic communication as an assessment and a process to support strategic objectives, and as a grouping of capabilities that are used to deliver the message.[19] The QDR does not attempt to define strategic communication, but does mention a need for strategic communication programs, plans, and policies to support GCCs.[20]

As a result of the QDR, the *QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication* was published on October 2006 (QDRERSC). This is the first time the term "strategic communication" is defined within the USG. Strategic communication was defined as "focused USG processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to the advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power."[21]

In addition to the definition above, the QDRERSC established the goal of "developing a culture that recognizes the value of communication and integrates communication considerations into policy development, operational planning, execution, and assessment to advance national interests."[22] Three objectives were crafted in support of this goal. The objectives provided additional guidance in the establishment of doctrine, the establishment of responsibilities and relationships, and resourcing of equipment.[23]

Although the QDRERSC recognized the need to establish doctrine to better integrate strategic communication into operational planning, today, joint forces still lack doctrine from

which to plan. The most valuable aspect of the QDRERSC to GCCs is that it allocated funds

to develop operational concepts on how to best employ the Joint Public Affairs Support

Element (JPASE), DoD PSYOP capabilities, and combat camera organizations in support of

strategic communication. Additionally, the QDRERSC called for the development of

operational concepts on how to best employ cross-cultural communication and language

expertise; regionally focused activities to collect, analyze, and fuse open-source information;

Theater Security Cooperation Strategies and Implementation Plans; and Defense Support of

Public Diplomacy programs.[24] The weakness of these operational concepts is that they

lacked doctrinal foundation when employed in the context of strategic communication.

The QDRERSC literally defined strategic communication for the DoD, and this

definition is congruent with the process to "understand," "engage," "advise," and "influence"

established in DSB 2004. For the first time, GCC staffs had a definition to use for planning,

but there is still much to be done in the development of joint doctrine.

Recognizing the continuously changing global environment, the DoD requested the

Defense Science Board to conduct a summer study in 2007 on *Challenges of Military*

Operations in Support of U.S. Interests which was published on December, 2008. Within the

context of this larger study, the Task Force on Strategic Communication reconvened to

review and asses the recommendations and progress made since the completion of the earlier

studies on strategic communication. Their latest report on this topic is the *Report of the*

Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication published on January, 2008 (DSB

2008). This time, strategic communication was defined as "a sustained and coherent set of

activities that include understanding, advising, engaging, influencing, and measuring. These

activities are elements in a continuous, dynamic, and interactive process that begins with

choices among strategic priorities and deep comprehension of attitudes and cultures."[25] This is a much better definition for the GCCs because it succinctly articulates that strategic communication is a continuous process that is interactive and requires measuring, something missing from the QDRERSC definition. As defined by the QDRERSC, there is no mention of the need for long term engagement or the complex nature of communicating with a foreign audience.

The DSB 2008 offered seven recommendations to the SECDEF. Reflecting the recommendation from the DSB 2004, the DSB 2008 focused on ways to improve organizations, develop tools and technologies to support strategic communication, and leverage programs for the enhancement of strategic communication.[26] The DSB 2008 also described strategic communication as an "instrument of statecraft that depends on shared knowledge and adaptive networks."[27]

The evolution of strategic communication over the past decade has been very incongruent. Initially, the DSB 2000 used the term strategic in the context of an information operation with strategic effects. Later, the DSB 2001 made use of the term strategic information (used together) making reference to a level of coordination (national level of government), and a method of dissemination. Strategic communication, first used in the DoD in 2004, referred to a process. The QDR in turn referred to strategic communication as a process that requires assessment, and the capabilities needed to deliver the message. Finally, the QDRERSC and the DSB 2008 referred to strategic communication as a process and a dialogue.

As strategic communication evolved, joint doctrine defined it as "focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create,

8

strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power."[28] This is only slightly modified from the definition of the QDRERSC, and there is no indication that the definition will change in the near future, despite further research and studies on the topic by the Defense Science Board and others.

Joint Publication 3-13 goes on to list primary supporting capabilities of strategic communication as Public Affairs (PA), Defense Support of Public Diplomacy (DSPD), and Information Operations (IO) capabilities.[29] However, this is where current doctrine culminates. Joint doctrine emphasizes the importance of synchronizing PA, DSPD, and IO in support of strategic communication, but does not go on to develop how these relationships should be established, or what framework planners should use. Strategic communication, as defined today, evolved from a series of lessons learned and best practices captured by the Defense Science Board studies and the QDR. The challenge with this approach is that there is no baseline from which to adapt. The lack of theory in the development of strategic communication doctrine delivers to planners a system that is continuing to change in a pragmatic way, instead of providing a common point of departure for analysis and thought.

DISCUSSION

As strategic communication doctrine emerges, the lack of scholarly research in the field of public diplomacy and strategic communication must be accounted for.[30] As discussed in the previous section, strategic communication has been used to describe the means of delivering a message (technical aspects), the effects of the message (strategic consequence), and the coordination of the message (process). Since joint doctrine has

defined strategic communication as a process, and future definitions will likely define strategic communication as a process also, developing joint doctrine must address the interrelationship between the desired objective (ends), the message and the intended audience (ways), and the delivery mechanism (means). This relationship should be addressed within a framework for analysis, and a model for communication that will allow GCC staffs to integrate strategic communication into operational joint commands in order to make them more effective.

Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication

DoD defines public diplomacy as "those overt international public information activities of the USG designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad."[31]

In short, public diplomacy is global dialogue. It is "the means by which states, association of states, and non-state actors understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance their interests and values."[32] By law, this is a function of the Department of State (DoS).[33] But the need for the DoD and DoS to collaborate in the field is well documented throughout all the Defense Science Board studies, and in the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*.[34]

"Public diplomacy differs from education, journalism, advertising, branding, and public relations, however, it imports methods and discourse norms from civil society, and it depends on deep and diverse relationships with civil society to succeed."[35] Public diplomacy, as strategic communication, is about dialogue with key audiences, and the *U.S.*

National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication does not differentiate between public diplomacy and strategic communication, making use of the terms analogously.[36] If public diplomacy and strategic communication are inherently defined the same way, then the theoretical framework needed for strategic communication doctrine will be found in the developing field of public diplomacy.

Information Operations and Strategic Communication

Doctrinally, IO is a function that seeks to integrate "electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), operations security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), and military deception (MILDEC) and related capabilities to disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own."[37] IO may target cognitive, informational and/or physical dimensions of the information environment.[38]

With the understanding that current joint doctrine defines strategic communication as a process and IO as an integrating function, differentiating between the two becomes easier. Strategic communication seeks to target "key audiences" (friendly, neutral, and adversarial), to "understand and engage." IO seeks to target adversarial human and automated decision making to disrupt, corrupt, or usurp. Strategic communication works in the cognitive dimension. IO works in the cognitive, informational, and physical dimensions. DoD supports strategic communication with DSPD, PA and IO (specifically PSYOP). IO integrates EW, CNO, OPSEC, MILDEC, and PSYOP; has five supporting capabilities, information assurance, physical security, physical attack, combat camera, and counterintelligence; and has three related capabilities, PA, PSYOP, and DSPD.

The nuances and differences between strategic communication and IO are significant

to the development of joint doctrine as strategic communication is often confused as

"strategic" IO (in contrast to operational or tactical IO). Developing doctrine must articulate

the difference between the two. This is critical to having the ability to define target

audiences for strategic communication and IO at operational joint force headquarters.

Framework for Analysis

In a field where theory is still under development, leading scholars often cite Dr.

Mark Leonard's public diplomacy variables as a potential foundation of public diplomacy

theory.[39] One of these scholars, Dr. Eytan Gilboa, integrates the variables into a single

framework.[40] This framework could serve as a foundation for doctrine in this emerging field

of academic study.

Dr. Leonard's variables distinguish between three dimensions of public diplomacy:

news management, medium range campaigns on high value policies,[41] and relationship

building.[42] The three dimensions engage within three spheres: political/military, economic,

and social/cultural.[43] The framework offers two types of public diplomacy engagement:

cooperation and competition.[44] Finally, Dr. Leonard distinguishes between five public

diplomacy instruments which can help deliver the message: Non-Governmental Organization

(NGO) diplomacy, Diaspora diplomacy, political party diplomacy, brand diplomacy, and

business diplomacy.[45]

Dr. Gilboa takes these variables and connects them into a single framework following

a "structured focused comparison."[46] Within the framework, the three dimensions of public

diplomacy are characterized by the time in which they seek to achieve their objective and the

purpose. News management can be measured in hours or days and is reactive in nature,

12

medium range campaigns on high value policies can be measured in weeks or months and is

proactive in nature, and relationship building can be measured in years and emphasizes long

term relationship building. GCC staffs tend to focus most of their effort on the news

management dimension, and refer to this as strategic communication.[47] This is a very narrow

way to define the operational challenge of strategic communication, and neglects the

importance of working across all three dimensions of strategic communication to achieve

stated objectives. Additionally, all three dimensions are applied within all three spheres,[48]

and engagement within all three spheres, along the range of all three dimensions, can be

cooperative or competitive.[49]

The five diplomacy instruments identified by Dr. Leonard build on the Walter

Lippmann premise that most people don't choose between true and false messengers, they

choose between trustworthy and untrustworthy messengers.[50] Following this logic, Dr.

Leonard suggests that NGOs, Diaspora, political party, brand, and business diplomacy are

instruments that provide trustworthy messengers to numerous audiences through the use of

already established relationships and name recognition. This is another area where the lack

of doctrine hinders GCC planners' ability to align messages with messengers. The

messenger is just as important as the message; planners must understand that the messenger

must be handpicked to communicate to an audience, and that the messenger communicating

with a single audience might not be effective across all three dimensions of strategic

communication.

Developing doctrine on a theoretical model like the one suggested by Dr. Gilboa,

based on the variables outlined by Dr. Leonard, will allow GCC planners to better understand

the complex information environment and develop better processes to support their

respective organizations. Having already established that public diplomacy and strategic communication are analogous terms, this framework could serve as a solid foundation from which to develop operational joint doctrine.

Model for Communication

In addition to a framework for analysis, the development of strategic communication doctrine must consider a model for communication. A framework allows GCC planners to understand the parameters within which they have to work; the model for communication allows the GCC planners to understand how the message should be communicated to the "target audience."

Whether PA or PSYOP, much of the argument on how they support strategic communication revolves around the "tailoring" of the message to engage a specific audience, and who might be most capable of accomplishing the task.[51] Current doctrine for PA and PSYOP, emphasize the crafting of the message, and the capacity to deliver the message. This method of communicating is based on the message influence model of communications, a long standing model frequently used in advertising and public relations. [52]

The message influence model assumes that communication is the transfer of meaning from person to person and the message sent is the one that counts.[53] However, this model does not account for the meaning listeners give the message based on factors like "autobiography, history, local context, culture, language, power relations, and immediate personal needs."[54] Given the large amount of research and writing on this topic since the turn of the century, message influence modeling has not worked well in the complex information environment of the post 9/11 world. Operational joint commands have identified

this shortcoming, and continuously assess how the message is being received by the intended audiences.[55]

Strategic communication must transition to a more modern model for communication than one that puts most of the effort on the crafting of the message as PA and PSYOP practitioners might suggest. An alternative is the Pragmatic Complexity Model (PCOM). This communication model recognizes that the "message received is the one that really counts," a fact that GCC commanders and staffs have already learned on their own based on emerging lessons learned from the field.[56] The PCOM does not assume that there is a listener "out there" waiting to be impacted by a message. Instead, the messenger and the listener are locked in a relationship of simultaneous, mutual interdependence. The listener is influenced by the messenger's behavior as well as the listener's expectations, interpretations, and attributions with respect to the messenger.[57]

As joint strategic communication doctrine continues to develop, it must address the complexities of the 21st century information environment by including a communication model that will allow GCC planners to develop plans for communicating the message. The pragmatic complexity model will allow GCC planners to better understand communication modeling and provide them the tools to develop better messaging strategies.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Secretary of Defense Dr. Robert Gates, on his April 17, 2009 address to the Naval War College, mentioned that the now defunct U.S. Information Agency had a tremendous impact on the winning the cold war. Dr. Gates was alluding to the importance of strategic communication in winning the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the need to have

15

the capability to communicate messages and information that would create an environment favorable to the U.S. and its allies.

To achieve this end, the military must enable success within the unique communication environment by creating doctrine that establishes the foundation for analysis function, and communication. These elements of the strategic communication doctrine would reflect an understanding of what strategic communication is, and how it should be employed at the joint operational level.

As this doctrine is written, it should be firmly anchored on theory, as opposed to temporal lessons learned which are specific to a particular environment at a particular point of time. Doctrine based on the framework for analysis and communication model could serve as sound foundation for the continued discussion among scholars and practitioners in a field that the USG has recognized as "critical to achieving all U.S. strategic objectives."[58]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Through the Defense Science Board studies, in addition to the QDRERSC initiatives, significant progress has been made in the development of strategic communication. However, much remains to be done in the development of joint doctrine for operational commanders. If strategic communication is in fact going to be priority effort within the DoD, JFCOM must draft and deliver joint doctrine to GCC commanders and staffs soon. To this end, this research paper recommends four points of action.

First, that the DoD adopt the DSB 2008 definition of strategic communication. This definition offers the most accurate and comprehensive articulation of what strategic communication is today. In contrast to the most current definition found in joint doctrine, the DSB 2008 definition best describes the long term implications of strategic communication

along with the need to understand the target audience along with measuring the effectiveness of the messages the USG is attempting to communicate.

Second, that the development of strategic communication doctrine be founded on public diplomacy theory. Given that strategic communication is a relatively new concept for the DoD, doctrine writers must look outside the DoD for theoretic basis from which to write the doctrine. If the USG defines strategic communication and public diplomacy to be analogous, then it is in the realm of public diplomacy that the academic foundation for strategic communication doctrine will be found.

Third, that joint doctrine adopt the framework for analysis presented by Dr. Gilboa. This framework will allow GCC planners to better understand the complex information environment and help develop better processes to support their respective organizations.

Finally, that joint doctrine adopt the pragmatic complexity model of communication. As joint strategic communication doctrine continues to develop, it must address the complexities of the 21st century information environment by including a communication model that will allow GCC planners to develop plans for communicating the message. The pragmatic complexity model will allow GCC planners to better understand communication modeling and provide them the tools to develop better messaging strategies.

NOTES

[1] U.S. President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: 2006), 9.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006*, (Washington, DC: 2006), 91-2.

[3] James G. Starvidis, "Strategic Communication and National Security", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (3rd Quarter, 2007): 4.

[4] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) in Times of Military Conflict*, (Washington, DC: May, 2000), 6.

[5] Ibid, 28.

[6] Ibid, 6-7.

[7] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) in Times of Military Conflict*, (Washington, DC: May, 2000), 52-4.

[8] At the time of the DSB 2000, PSYOP had four categories. The fourth category not discussed is inconsequential to defining strategic, and JP 3-53 published on September 2003 removes it from PSYOP doctrine.

[9] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination*, (Washington, DC: October, 2001), Annex I.

[10] Ibid, 16.

[11] Ibid, 5-7.

[12] Ibid, 7.

[13] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: September, 2004), Appendix A.

[14] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: September, 2004), 14.

[15] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: September, 2004), 6-9.

[16] Idid, 83.

[17] Ibid, 11.

[18] Interview with Bruce Gregory, April 8, 2009.

[19] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: February, 2006), 92.

[20] Ibid.

[21] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: September, 2006), 3.

[22] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: September, 2006), 3.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid, 7.

[25] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: January, 2008), 11.

[26] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: January, 2008), XIV-XX.

[27] Ibid, 13.

[28] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: 26 December 2006), I-10.

[29] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations* (Washington, DC: 13 February 2006), I-10.

[30] Eytan Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616* (March 2008): 73.

[31] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations* (Washington, DC: 13 February 2006), GL-11.

[32] Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience," *Small Wars Journal* (August 14, 2008). http://www.gwu.edu/~smpa/faculty/BruceGregory.cfm (Accessed February 25, 2009).

[33] The United States Code, Title 22 - Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Chapter 38 - Department of State, Sec 2732, "Public diplomacy responsibilities of the Department of State," Statute C, "Objectives". http://uscode.house.gov/uscode- (Accessed March 24, 2009).

[34] U.S. Department of State, *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* (Washington, DC: June, 2007).

[35] Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience," *Small Wars Journal* (August 14, 2008). http://www.gwu.edu/~smpa/faculty/BruceGregory.cfm (Accessed February 25, 2009).

[36] Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience," *Small Wars Journal* (August 14, 2008). http://www.gwu.edu/~smpa/faculty/BruceGregory.cfm (Accessed February 25, 2009).

[37] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations* (Washington, DC: 13 February 2006), GL-9.

[38] Information Environment is defined as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. JP 3-13.

[39] Dr. Leonard's work is cited by Dr. Bruce Gregory, Dr. Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Eytan Gilboa, all leading scholars in the field of public diplomacy.

[40] Eytan Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616* (March 2008): 72.

[41] "Medium range campaigns on high value policies" is the term used by Dr. Bruce Gregory in his work titled "Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience" to describe medium range public diplomacy. Dr. Leonard's second dimension of public diplomacy is "strategic communication", however, his definition is not the same as the U.S. DoD definition and for the purpose of this research paper, the use of this term will create unnecessary confusion.

[42] Mark Leonard, *Public Diplomacy* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 8-21.

[43] Ibid, 10.

[44] Ibid, 22-30.

[45] Mark Leonard, *Public Diplomacy* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 54-71.

[46] Eytan Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616* (March 2008): 72.

[47] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices 2007-2008 (Suffolk, VA: March 10, 2009).

[48] Spheres carry different weights at different times, and in different context. When communicating with some countries, political/military messages will outweigh economic and social/cultural. For other countries, economic, or social/cultural messages will outweigh political/military. Yet for other countries, there is a need to provide equal weigh to any combination of two spheres, or to all three of them at the same time.

[49] Cooperative public diplomacy engagement is characterized by the common ground a group of nations may have to engage with a country in which they wish to establish a relationship. This is the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan. The NATO leadership in Afghanistan conducts diplomacy to achieve an objective that is common to all the member nations. Competitive public diplomacy engagement is characterized by nations conducting public diplomacy through bilateral or multilateral agreements that serve to further the interests of a particular nation. Interests are typically political influence, military cooperation, trade, and investment to name a few.

[50] Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1997).

[51] Ibid.

[52] Steven R. Corman, Angela Trethewey, and H.L. Goodall, Jr, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008), 156.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices 2007-2008 (Suffolk, VA: March 10, 2009), 13.

[56] Steven R. Corman, Angela Trethewey, and H.L. Goodall, Jr, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008), 156.

[57] Ibid, 160.

[58] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: January, 2008), 3-9.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amend, Kurt. "Counterinsurgency Principles for the Diplomat (SWJ Blog)."
    http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/counterinsurgency-principles-f/ (accessed
    March 19, 2009).

Armistead, Edwin L. *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*.
    Dulles, VA: Potomac Books Inc., 2004.

Babst, Stephanie. Atlantic Community: Open Think Tank Article "NATO's New Public
    Diplomacy: The Art of Engaging and Influencing"." http://www.atlantic-
    community.org/index/articles/view/NATO%27s_New_Public_Diplomacy:_The_Art_
    of_Engaging_and_Influencing (accessed March 25, 2009).

---. "Reinventing NATO's Public Diplomacy." *NATO Research Paper*, no. 41 (November
    2008). http://www.nato.int/issues/military_structure/command/index-e.html (accessed
    March 28, 2009).

Carnes, Lord. "On The Nature of Strategic Communications." *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*,
    no. 46 (Summer 2007): 87-89.

Corman, Steven R., Angela Trethewey, and H.L. Goodall Jr. *Weapons of Mass Persuasion:
    Strategic Communication to Combat Violent Extremism*. New York: Peter Lang
    Publishing, 2008.

Cowan, Geoffrey, and Nicholas J. Cull. *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World*. Sage
    Publications, Inc, 2008.

Darley, William M. "The Missing Component of U.S. Strategic Communications.." *JFQ:
    Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 47 (Fall 2007): 109-113.

Deutsch, Robert D. "The Droning of Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy."
    Military Review 87, no. 5 (September 2007): 124-125.

Eder, Mari K. "The Missing Element: Strategic Communication." *United States Naval
    Institute. Proceedings* 135, no. 2 (February 2009): 28.

---. "Toward Strategic Communication." *Military Review* 87, no. 4 (July 2007): 61-70.

Flick, Nathaniel C., and John A. Nagl. "Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan
    Edition." *Foreign Policy*.
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587 (accessed March 19,
    2009).

Ford, Jess T. "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy: GAO-05-323.." *GAO Reports* (April 4, 2005): 1.

Fukuyama, Francis. *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. 1st ed. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.

Goldman, Emily. "Strategic Communication Theory and Application," June 2008.

Gough, Susan L. "The Evolution of Strategic Influence," April 7, 2003.

Gregory, Bruce. "Public Diplomacy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the U.S. Experience." *Small Wars Journal* (April 28, 2008). http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/08/public-diplomacy-and-national.php (accessed February 25, 2009).

---. "Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons From the U.S. Experience." *Small Wars Journal* (August 14, 2008). http://www.gwu.edu/~smpa/faculty/BruceGregory.cfm (accessed February 25, 2009).

---. "Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms," August 31, 2005.

---. "Upgrading Public Diplomacy Tools - New Challenges, Old Realities." *Small Wars Journal* (July 2, 2007). http://www.gwu.edu/~smpa/faculty/BruceGregory.cfm (accessed February 25, 2009).

Habeck, Mary. *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*. Yale University Press, 2007.

Halloran, Richard. "Strategic Communication." *Parameters* 37, no. 3 (Autumn 2007): 4.

Holmes, Kim. "President-elect Obama, we need a new kind of public diplomacy." *The Washington Times*, November 20, 2008, sec. NATION; WHATS THE BIG IDEA; A04. http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.588323.2658680046&target=results_listview_resultsNav&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235008359974&returnToKey=20_T5822757818&parent=docview (accessed February 18, 2009).

Jenkins, Curtis. "Taking the Communication High Ground: The Case for a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force for Strategic Communication.." *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 29, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 36-38.

Julian, Gregory. "Transforming DoD Strategic Communication Strategy," March 15, 2006.

Kilcullen, David J. "Countering Global Insurgency," November 30, 2004.

---. "New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict: The Need for a Grand Strategy for Combating Terrorism," May 6, 2008. http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/May/20080522172835SrenoD0.8730585.html (accessed March 6, 2009).

Kirk, Grayson. "Strategic Communications in the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs* 20, no. 4 (July 1942): 762-766.

Leibstone, Marvin. "Strategic Communications--Global Security & Being Understood.." *Military Technology* 29, no. 9 (2005): 6.

Leonard, Mark. "Public Diplomacy." London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002.

Lippmann, Walter. *Public Opinion*. New York: Free Press, 1997.

Lobe, Jim. "Mideast: Obama's Quick Start On Diplomacy Raises Hopes." *Global Information Network* (January 28, 2009). http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1634515831&Fmt=7&clientId=18762&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed February 18, 2009).

Malik, Iftikhar H. *Jihad, Hindutva and the Taliban: South Asia at the Crossroads*. Oxford University Press, USA, 2005.

McCain, John. "The Situation in Afghanistan: Senator John McCain on How to Win the War." AEI Online - Speeches, February 25, 2009. http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.29452,filter.all/pub_detail.asp (accessed February 27, 2009).

Murphy, Dennis M. "The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s)." *IO Sphere* 2-08 (January 2008).

Nye, Joseph S. "Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century." *The Globalist*, May 10, 2004. http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3885 (accessed April 5, 2009).

---. *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*. Public Affairs, 2005.

---. *Understanding International Conflicts (4th Edition)*. 4th ed. Longman, 2003.

Peskowitz, Azriel. "Information Operations on the Counterinsurgency Battlefield." *Small Wars Journal*, February 22, 2009. http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2009/02/information-operations-on-the.php (accessed February 27, 2009).

Phares, Walid. *The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Pincus, Walter. "GAO Calls for A New Priority On Public Diplomacy." *The Washington Post*, January 12, 2009, sec. A-SECTION; Pg. A11. http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.351275.086983507&target=results_listview_resultsNav&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235008273734&returnToKey=20_T5822749459&parent=docview (accessed February 18, 2009).

Ranjan, Ambresh. "Rep. Thornberry Introduces Strategic Communication Act." *US Fed News Service, Including US State News* (February 2, 2009). http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1636862391&Fmt=7&clientId=18762&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed February 19, 2009).

Roosevelt, Ann. "USJFCOM Works Strategic Communication Initiative.." *Defense Daily* 235, no. 29 (August 10, 2007): 9.

Satloff, Robert. *The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East*. First. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004.

Shanker, Thom. "U.S. Ponders War Message, And How Best to Deliver It." *The New York Times*, November 15, 2007, sec. Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 19. http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.183910.8127864736&target=results_listview_resultsNav&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1234989150745&returnToKey=20_T5820475344&parent=docview (accessed February 18, 2009).

Stavridis, James G. "Strategic Communication and National Security.." *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 46 (Summer 2007): 4-7.

Thorp IV, Frank. "Strategic Communication in the Department of Defense..." *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 45 (Spring 2007): 2-3.

United States Code. Title 22 - Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Chapter 38 - Department of State, Sec 2732, "Public diplomacy responsibilities of the Department of State," Statute C, "Objectives"." http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t21t25+2634+0++%28%29%20%20AND%20%28%2822%29%20ADJ%20USC%29%3ACITE%20AND%20%28USC%20w%2F10%20%282732%20%29%29%3ACITE%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20 (accessed March 24, 2009).

U.S. Department of Defense. *Report of the Defense Science Board on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) in Time of Military Conflict*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 2000.

---. *Report of the Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 2001.

---. *Information Operations Roadmap*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 30, 2003.

---. *Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication.* Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 23, 2004.

---. *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report 2006.* Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 6, 2006.

---. *Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap.* Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 25, 2006.

---. *Implementation of Department of Defense Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan.* Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 12, 2007.

---. *Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication.* Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 4, 2008.

---. *The Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on the Challenges to Military Operation in Support of National Interests.* Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2008.

U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State. *U.S. Government Counter Insurgency Guide.* Washington, DC: Department of Defense and Department of State, January 2009.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. GAO Report on Public Diplomacy - Interagency Integration. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April, 2005.

---. GAO Report on Public Diplomacy - Engaging Muslim Audiences. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2006.

U.S. Joint Forces Command. Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices 2007-2008. Suffolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational Analysis, March 10, 2009.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, February 13, 2008.

---. Joint Operation Planning. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, December 26, 2006.

---. Information Operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13. Washington, DC: CJCS, February
      13, 2006.

---. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-53. Washington,
      DC: CJCS, September 5, 2003.

U.S. President. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
      Washington, DC: White House, 2006.

---. U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications.
      Washington, DC: White House, December, 2006.

Waller, J. Michael. *The Public Diplomacy Reader*. The Institute of World Politics Press,
      2007.

Willard, Jed. "The Pentagon and Public Diplomacy: In Flux." Lecture, Fletcher School of
      Public Diplomacy Seminar, Medford, MA, April 25, 2008.